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Dive, Learn, Eat: Rebreather Meeting in Italy

How would you like to spend four days with a group of passionate adventurers on an island in southern Italy, diving rebreathers on submerged seamounts, getting briefed by some of the biggest diving brains on the planet, and eating to your heart’s content? Thought so! Unfortunately, you missed it. But here are the some of the highlights and takeaways presented by InDepth’s executive editor who was in attendance. Hey someone had to go.

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by Michael Menduno

May 1, 2019—Nearly three dozen rebreather aficionados made the biannual trek to Ponza, Italy, a picturesque island in the Tyrrhenian Sea about a three-hour journey from Rome. They were there for the sixth International Rebreather Meeting organized by Andrea Donati, owner of Ponza Diving Center, and his partner Daniela Spaziani. The goal of the four-day meeting, which was sponsored by a number of manufacturers and organizations, including JJ CCR, Shearwater, DAN Europe, Società Italiana Medicina Subacquea e Iperbarica (SIMI), and the Italian rebreather users’ association CCR Italia, was to provide the latest research and information to the rebreather community.

Photo by Peter Symes.

“They’re passionate tech divers hungry for information,” explained Dr. Simon Mitchell, a professor of anesthesiology at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, who was one of the presenters. “That’s what I love about these types of meetings. I am happy to be here and share what I know.”

Taking a cue from the hyperbaric medical community, the meeting was organized to appeal to diver sensibilities; diving in the morning (8:30 a.m.- 2:00 p.m.), and lectures and discussion in the afternoon (3:00 p.m. – 7:00 p.m.) followed by dinner and drinks (9:00p.m. – 11:30 p.m. or later).

Dive Right In!

Donati and his crew did a masterful job of supporting more than twenty rebreather divers bearing scooters, cameras, and bailout bottles, along with a few open circuit divers, without incident. Their enthusiastic attitude and thoughtful attention to detail, whether it was solving specific problems with individual’s rebreathers, or bringing in attendees dry suit underwear hanging on the exterior of the boat before the after dinner rain hit, helped the operation run smoothly and efficiently while feeling relaxed. They were aided by Ponza Diving’s ubiquitous mascot, an amicable large black matif named Ugo.

The boat, which was docked just outside of the dive shop, headed out each morning around 8:30 a.m., as divers huddled over Italian espresso and fresh bread after prepping their breathers. Interestingly, as we were loading up the boat on the first day there, Donati made a point of warning both me and Peter Symes, publisher of X-Ray magazine, to go easy on the coffee. “It can kill you,” he said with all seriousness, citing an American diver who had a heart attack underwater after consuming too many cups of espresso. The boat then made its way to one of the numerous submerged seamounts covered in soft corals surrounding the island, where it would anchor for the morning dive.

Photo by Marco Sieni.

Our morning dives were typically 165-261 ft/50-80m deep with one-to-two-hour run times. Visibility was 50-65 ft/15-20 m and water temperature was about 58-60°F/15-16°C. Following each dive, we were treated to a multi-course lunch, which usually included soup, fish, cephalopods, rice, pasta, bread, salad, and dessert, along with the requisite pitcher of wine and more espresso. After lunch, the boat headed back to port, where we prepped gear for the next day’s dive.

Where’s The Manzo, err Beef?

While rebreather diving in Ponza was clearly the attraction that brought people together, the presentations, given by some of the community’s leading scientists, engineers, and practitioners were the meat of the meeting. (Are you detecting a pattern here?) Our group met in an old stone chapel up the hill from the dive shop. Headphones were available for sequential English and Italian translation.

One of the themes that emerged from the meeting was the role of human factors, i.e. the way we process and act on and or fail to act on information, and its impact on diving safety. This is a deep body of knowledge that was developed in the aviation and healthcare fields and is now being applied to diving largely through the efforts of pioneer Gareth Lock at The Human Diver. Several of us noted that human factors were being discussed in the absence of the seemingly ubiquitous Lock, was a sign that this important work was beginning to gain traction. Here are some of the highlights.

Photo by Peter Symes.

Training Doesn’t Work: Technical Diving International (TDI) Rebreather Instructor, Instructor Trainer, and author Mark Powell began with a list of ten improvements in rebreather diving that he would like to see from a community perspective; things like better buoyancy control, the increased use of checklists, and more attention to bailout planning. He then asked the question, “Why hasn’t training made a difference?” That is, why hasn’t training produced permanent observable changes in divers’ behavior in these areas? The answer, documented by numerous studies, is that humans aren’t very good at retaining information.

The solution: deliberate practice of essential skills. “People tend to practice things they like and are good at, which is not very helpful,” Powell explained, noting that practicing things that are very difficult to do doesn’t work either. “The sweet spot,” he said, “is practicing things that are challenging.” He recommended that divers practice something on every dive! Sounded very GUE to me.

In-water Recompression (IWR): The use of in-water recompression to treat divers at remote locations has long been controversial, and until recently the hyperbaric medical community has failed to reach a conclusion regarding its efficacy. But as Simon Mitchell explained, the situation has now changed as a result of a new paper, “In-Water Recompression”, he co-authored with Dr. David Doolette, a decompression physiologist at the U.S. Navy Experimental Diving Unit (and a GUE diver). The two were able to find evidence not previously reported that answers two key questions:

  1. Does early recompression improve outcomes? (i.e. recompressing an injured diver within minutes vs hours)
  2. Is shallower, shorter recompression effective? (Note that IWR typically compresses the diver on 100% oxygen to 30 ft/9 m vs. a USN Table 6 to 60 ft/18 m.)

Based on U.S. Navy data derived in part from early research on treatment protocols, Mitchell and Doolette were able to answer both questions strongly in the affirmative. The new recommendation: A diver should be treated with IWR if a chamber is more than two hours away and the team is set up to provide IWR (i.e. has proper equipment such as full face mask and training, support, environmental conditions, and appropriate patent status).

Defensive Dive Profiling/Concerns for Aging Divers

Dr. Neal Pollock, research chair in hyperbaric and diving medicine at Université Laval, gave a pair of eye-opening lectures on the potential long-term impacts of decompression stress, what can be done, and the prospects for aging divers. Was he talking about us?

Photo by Marco Sieni.

Pollock began by citing studies that found lesions in the brain and spinal cord have been observed with higher frequency in individuals with a history of repeated decompression stress. Bone lesions have also been found in commercial divers. The factors shown to increase the risk of dysbaric osteonecrosis in commercial divers were: a history of inadequate or experimental decompression, diving deeper than 165 ft/50 m, and a history of decompression sickness (DCS). The conclusion: while dysbaric osteonecrosis has largely been eliminated in commercial diving due to procedural changes, decompression stress poses a potential long-term risk factor for technical divers! Divers need to think about immediate and long-term risk.

As a result, Pollock, who is known for doing extra deco, encouraged divers to do longer shallow decompression adding, “It can’t hurt. It can only help.” Specifically, he recommended several ways of adding conservatism: using conservative gradient factors, primarily reducing GF-high, buffering the dive by slowing down on the final ascent to the surface following the last high pO2 stop, delaying exercise post-dive, extending surface intervals to add more time for recovery, using appropriate gasses (Yes, “air is for tires!”), choosing appropriate partners with similar risk tolerances, and maintaining good physical fitness.

The bottom line for aging divers; there is no upper age limit, though there may come a point where you need greater support. Be forewarned! Note, there were several post 65-year-old divers making the plunge at Ponza!

Presenters: L to R: Dott. Pasquale Longobardi, president of SIMI, TDI instructor trainer Mark Powell, Dr. Simon Mitchell, professor of anesthesiology, University of Auckland, New Zealand, Dr. Neal Pollock, research chair in hyperbaric and diving medicine at Université Laval, Dott. Alessandro Marroni, president of DAN Europe, Shearwater founder Bruce Partridge, DAN Europe research supervisor Massimo Pieri and Eduardo Pavia, owner of Sea Dweller Divers.

Human Factors In Rebreather Diving: Mitchell began by noting that human factors were the most important, but also the hardest, path to improving safety in rebreather diving. He then posed the question: Is there a safety problem with rebreather diving?

Mitchell began by reviewing what we know about rebreather safety based on the ground-breaking 2012 paper by Dr. Andrew Fock analyzing recreational rebreather deaths 1998-2010, to wit: There were approximately 20 deaths/year for 2000-2010 from a population, which was then estimated to be about 18,000 rebreather divers based on agency certifications. That means that the fatality rate for rebreather diving was estimated to be about 133 deaths/100,000 divers/year compared to about 16 deaths/100,000 divers/year for open circuit diving. The conclusion: rebreather diving was about 10x more hazardous than open circuit scuba. Note, there is currently a follow up study underway to determine if things have improved.

Mitchell broke down the causes of rebreather fatalities into three buckets:  

• Hazards of advanced diving

• Rebreather equipment failures

• Diver error and violations

Overwhelmingly, most incidents arose from diver errors (Trying to do the right thing but doing the wrong thing) and violations (Knowingly creating unnecessary risk of harm to yourself and others, and expecting to get away with it). “I have made errors and violations in my rebreather diving,” Mitchell offered to the assembled group of divers, “and I bet you have too.”

What’s to be done?

Mitchell reviewed several fatalities involving violations, like diving with two-year old oxygen sensors, or using a type of sorb not specified by the manufacturer. He said that we needed to remove the motivation for violations. This involves a culture change: Make safe choices be seen as a strength versus a weakness. Training, mentoring, and role modeling are critical in this regard.

Typical errors might include forgetting to analyze one’s gas, forgetting to turn on the rebreather or open the oxygen valve, or leaving out an O-ring on the scrubber. In fact, each of these errors has resulted in multiple fatalities. Mitchell said that pre-dive checklists are the primary means for preventing errors. As a testament to the power, he cited a study analyzing the impact of using checklists in surgical suites: Deaths were reduced by 50% after the introduction of checklists, and as Mitchell pointed out, these were among highly trained professionals. He then cited a DAN study of some 2041 dives examining the impact of pre-dive checklist use on scuba mishaps; mishaps, including rapid ascents and low/out of air were reduced by 36%.

Photo by Michael Menduno.

The barriers to using checklists?

First, misunderstanding about their purpose; checklists are not meant to replace a manual! Second, arrogance/ignorance; I can do it from memory, or I don’t make mistakes. Checklists can be supported by training, practice, and engineering.

Interestingly, after the meeting I asked one of the Italian rebreather divers if he used a checklist on our dives. “My instructor taught me to do it by memory,” the diver told me, “So that is what I do. I haven’t had any problems.” Until he does, and therein lies the problem.

Bruce Partridge, founder of Shearwater Research, also focused his talk on human factors and changing divers’ behaviors. He began by talking a little about the history of Shearwater, which got it start making rebreather controllers before venturing into dive computers. He then discussed the work involved in assuring that rebreather sub-systems like controllers meet safety requirements as part of the CE 14143 standard, which they published in a 2013  IEEE paper. Partridge said he believed that the CE 14134 standard was a really good thing for the rebreather industry. Interestingly, he pointed that there were approximately 600 failure modes possible on a rebreather, however, only 40 were equipment related; the remainder involve diver errors.

Explorer Edoardo Pavia, owner of Sea Dweller Divers, also spoke passionately about rebreather safety in light of human factors from his personal experiences. He began by speaking about British expedition leader Carl Spencer’s tragic death on the 2009 Britannic Expedition. Spencer mistakenly breathed an unmarked, high-oxygen content bailout cylinder at depth and convulsed and drowned. Pavia shared his views about the importance of following manufacturers’ rules and recommendations regarding checklists, oxygen sensors lifetime, scrubber duration, using proper sorb, and the importance of bailout out valves (BOV). He concluded that ignorance was “the hardest monster to defeat.”

DCI Research/Telemedicine

Massimo “Max” Pieri, research supervisor for DAN Europe, presented their research focusing on preventing decompression illness (DCI) using DAN’s diving database of some 66,000 dives ranging in depth from 16-628 ft/5-192 m, average depth 100 ft/30 m. Some of the factors they have considered include: gradient factors, hydration, genetic disposition, and hematological parameters. They are also conducting a decompression study with a local (Italian) GUE group in cooperation with instructor Mario Arena, examining the efficacy of so-called “deep stops” vs shallow decompression profiles [See Dr. David Doolette’s post, “Gradient Factors in a Post-Deep Stops World,” in this blog issue for additional data].

Next, DAN Europe president Dr. Alessandro Marroni discussed his visionary program dubbed Advanced Virtually Assisted Telemedicine in Adverse Remoteness (AVATAR). Their goal is to develop tools and procedures to enable real-time monitoring of divers during their dives—think Fitbits on steroids! Marroni described his vision of a DAN doctor able to assess a diver who’s still in the water, and communicate directly with that diver via an underwater communications system. In fact, they have already tested prototypes.

Courtesy of DAN Europe.

Dott. Pasquale Longobardi, president of SIMI, also presented SIMI’s research examining the biochemical mechanisms involved in decompression stress.  He concluded with a set of best practices, namely to run pO2s at 1.3 bar or less, maintain pN2s at 3.16 bar (the equivalent of breathing air at 100 ft/30 m) or less and run pHe as high as possible; Longobardi stated that helium in the form of trimix protects divers from oxidative stress (inflammation) compared to diving air (kick those tires again!). A colleague in the audience told me he had questions about the supporting data.

Mangia Mangia

Having gotten our daily dose of brain food, attendees retired to their hotels and apartments  to catch up on email, clean up, and later walk to the ristorante du jour that had been chosen for that evening. There we were greeted by our attentive hosts, Andrea and Daniela, accompanied by Ugo, who had arranged for a family-style dinner with wine and made sure that everyone had enough to eat and drink. If you had trekked to the meeting for the food alone, you would have not been disappointed.

Photo by Michael Menduno.

“Mangia,” Dani told me gesturing emphatically with her hands and pointing to my empty plate, after the second, or was it the third course? “Please, you must eat some more,” she insisted passing me a bowl of mussels.” It felt like a family gathering—a family of passionate, geeky divers who were there to commune with their peers in celebration of l’arte e pratica che amiamo. And the eating and drinking and sharing of stories continued into the night.

Header Image: Marco Sieni.

Additional Resources:

X-Ray International Dive Magazine will be featuring more about the meeting and Ponza diving including some compelling images in their June issue.


Michael Menduno is InDepth’s executive editor and, an award-winning reporter and technologist who has written about diving and diving technology for 30 years. He coined the term “technical diving.” His magazine “aquaCORPS: The Journal for Technical Diving”(1990-1996), helped usher tech diving into mainstream sports diving. He also produced the first Tek, EUROTek, and ASIATek conferences, and organized Rebreather Forums 1.0 and 2.0. Michael received the OZTEKMedia Excellence Award in 2011, the EUROTek Lifetime Achievement Award in 2012 and the TEKDive USA Media Award in 2018.


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The Role of Agency When Discussing Diving Incidents: An Adverse Event Occurs—An Instructor Makes a Mistake

Human Factors educator and coach Gareth Lock examines the role of our innate attribution biases and language, in forming our collective judgements when incidents occur—in this case, by considering a student diving injury that occurred during a class. Was the instructor to blame? Was anyone?

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by Gareth Lock

Header Photo by Alexandra Graziano

What do you think when you read the following? Who is at fault? Where do you think the failures lie?

“The instructor failed to notice that the gas pressure in one of their four student’s cylinders was dropping faster than was expected, and consequently, missed that this particular student had run out of gas. The student then panicked and bolted for the surface which ended up with them having an arterial gas embolism.”

It would be normal for the majority of Western-cultured divers to believe that the fault would lie with the instructor, especially as I framed your thought processes with the subtitle, ‘An Instructor Makes a Mistake’. 

The instructor would have had a clear level of responsibility to make sure that the event didn’t happen the way it did, and because the student ended up with an out-of-gas situation and an arterial gas embolism, that instructor needs to be held accountable for the mistakes that were made. 

Financial compensation to the diver might be involved. As for the instructor, specific solutions for ways to prevent future mishaps would be standard. The instructor might be advised to be more aware, to monitor students more closely, and follow standards and/or training.

The problem with this approach is that it can miss significant contributory factors. Over thousands of years, we have developed a mindset that searches for the cause of an adverse event so that we can prevent the same thing from happening again. There are two parts behind this sentence that we are going to look at in this article—agency and attribution.

Agency and Attribution

Photo by Alexandra Graziano.

The first is Agency—an agent is a person or thing that takes an active role or produces a specific effect. ‘The instructor failed to notice the faster-than-normal pressure drop.’ In this example, the instructor is the agent. While we can easily identify the action and agent, we cannot determine from this simple statement whether the instructor intentionally didn’t monitor the gas, whether they accidentally missed the increased consumption rate or leak, whether the student didn’t inform the instructor, or if there was another reason. A reader of this short case study would normally assume that the instructor had some choice in the matter, that they were a free agent with free will, and that a professional with training should know better. This assumption can heavily influence how an ‘investigation’ develops from a blame-worthy event to one where wider learning can happen. 

Research has shown that the attribution of agency is subjective and is swayed by a number of different factors including culture, experience, and the language of the observer. Furthermore, the language used and how this frames the event has also been shown to directly influence the assignment of guilt, blame and/or punishment. This is especially the case if the only reports available are based around litigation and insurance claims, as these are purposely written to attribute blame. 

Societally, and developmentally, we believe that the attribution of cause behind an action is important, especially if it is an adverse event because it allows us to identify who or what needs to change to prevent the same or similar events from occurring in the future. In the out-of-gas event above, it might be obvious to some that it is the instructor who needs to change or ‘be changed’!

The Fundamental Attribution Bias

While agency is relatively clear when we describe an event, where this attribution of agency is applied is very subjective. Attribution theory was developed in the 1950s by Fritz Heider in which he described behaviours that could be attributed to internal characteristics or disposition (personality, abilities, mood, attitude, motivations, efforts, beliefs…) or to the influences external to them which were situational in nature (culture, social norms, peer pressure, help from others, organisational pressures, rules, environmental conditions…). For example, a diving student might not perform as expected despite having been given the training detailed in the course materials. This could be because of performance anxiety, lack of confidence, not paying attention to the demonstrations… (internal or dispositional attribution), or it could be caused by an argument they had had at home that morning, mortgage worries, homework which is due, promotion or threat of being fired, or poorly serviced equipment… (external or situational attribution).

Photo by Alexandra Graziano.

This subjectivity is so powerful and prevalent that there is a recognised cognitive bias called the fundamental attribution bias or error. This bias shows that there is a tendency to look for dispositional attribution when an adverse event involves someone else (they didn’t pay attention, they didn’t have the skills or experience), but the tendency to look for situational attribution when the adverse event involves us (high workload led me to be tired, the students were spread far apart, their gauge was in their BCD pocket). “When explaining someone’s behavior, we often underestimate the impact of the situation and overestimate the extent to which it reflects the individual’s traits and attitudes.” As a consequence, it is much easier to ascribe the failure to the individual rather than to look at the wider situation. This aligns with Lewin’s equation, B=f(P, E), which states that an individual’s behavior (B) is a function (f) of the person (P), including their history, personality and motivation, and their environment (E), which includes both their physical and social surroundings. 

Research has shown that culture can strongly influence how agency is attributed. Those from Western cultures e.g. Anglo-American or Anglo-Saxon European, have a tendency to be more individualistic in nature, whereas those from Far Eastern cultures have a more collective view of the world which increases collaboration, interdependence and social conformity. The research also shows that “Compared to people in interdependent societies, people in independent societies are more likely to select a single proximal cause for an event. Western cultures therefore have a tendency to erroneously attribute control and decision to the human actor closest to the event, even if this was not the case. This has huge implications when it comes to litigation and organisational/community learning.

Self-Serving and Defensive Attribution Bias 

When it comes to an adverse event, those cultures that have high individualistic behaviours are more likely to find a way to identify someone other than ourselves as the cause i.e. “the dive center manager didn’t tell me the time had changed, and so I was late for the boat.” Conversely, when we have a successful outcome, we are more likely to look to our own performance and traits (dispositional attribution) rather than the context (situational attribution) i.e. “I had spent time practising the ascents, so my buoyancy was good for the final dive.” without noticing that their buddy was rock solid in the water and provided a very stable platform to reference against. This is known as self-serving self-attribution.

As the severity of the event increases, we mentally distance ourselves further from the traits or behaviours that would have led to this event. “I wouldn’t have done that because I would have spotted the situation developing beforehand. I am more aware than that diver.” This defensive attribution is also known as distancing through differencing.

This is a protection mechanism; if we can shift the blame to someone else because they have a different disposition (internal behaviours/traits), we can convince ourselves that what we are doing is safe, and we carry on with what we were doing in the same way we’ve always done. This might appear to be simplistic; however, much of what we do is relatively simple in theory, it is how it is weaved into our daily lives that makes things complicated or complex. 

Photo by Alexandra Graziano.

Language Matters – Invisible Meanings

The subtitle of the first section “An adverse event occurs. An instructor makes a mistake.” will have invoked a number of mental shortcuts or heuristics in the reader. We will likely make an assumption that the two events are linked and that the instructor’s mistake led to the adverse event. I purposely wrote it this way. That link could be made stronger by changing the full stop to a comma.

Language can have a large impact on how we perceive agency and causality. The problem is that how we construct our messaging is not normally consciously considered when we write or speak about events. As with many other aspects of culture, it is invisible to the actor unless there is some form of (guided) active reflection.

For example, research has shown that there is a difference between how Spanish and English-speaking participants considered the intentional or unintentional actions in a series of videos. In one example, the actor in the video would pop a balloon with a pin (intentional) or put a balloon in a box with a (unknown) pin in it and the balloon would pop (unintentional) as the balloon hit the pin.“The participant descriptions were coded as being either agentive or non-agentive. An agentive description would be something like, “He popped the balloon.” A non-agentive description could be, “The balloon popped.” The study concluded that English, Spanish, and bilingual speakers described intentional events agentively, but English speakers were more likely than the other groups to use agentive descriptions for unintentional events. Another study showed similar results between English and Japanese speakers.



Another powerful bias exists in the form of framing. This is where information is given to another party to influence their decisions and is either done consciously or not. For example, take two yoghurt pots, the first says “10% fat” and the other says “90% fat free”. The framing effect will more likely lead us to picking the second option, as it seems likely it is the healthier yoghurt. If we look at how this applies to diving incidents and agentive language “The diver ran out of gas near the end of the dive.” or “Their cylinder was empty near the end of the dive.” The first appears to put the diver at fault but we don’t know how or why this happened; whereas, the second statement is not personal and therefore allows a less confrontational conversation. Consequently, we must be careful with how we attribute agency as it limits our attention to the context immediately surrounding the person involved. If we want to learn, we have to expand our curiosity beyond the individual and look at the context.

Another example of how language matters and the shortcuts we use is the use of binary oppositions e.g., right/wrong, deep/shallow, recreational/technical, success/error, or deserved DCS/undeserved DCS. While binary modes might work for technical or mechanical systems (work/don’t work), they are not suited for systems involving people (socio-technical systems) due to the complicated and complex interactions that are present. “They didn’t use a checklist.” Is often seen as a final reason why something went wrong, as opposed to asking questions like “What sort of checklist should have been used?”, “When would the checklist normally be used?”, “What were others doing at the time”, “Which checklist? Manufacturer’s, agency’s, or their own?” 

When it comes to these socio-technical systems, we can only determine success or error/failure AFTER the event. If the actors knew that what they were doing would end up as a failure due to an error, they would do something about that ‘error’ before it was too late.

Isn’t this just semantics?

All of this might appear to be semantics, and technically it is because semantics is the branch of linguistics and logic concerned with meaning. “Words create Worlds” (Heschel and Wittgenstein) for the better or worse. Think about how you frame an event or attribute agency because it WILL impact your own and others’ learning.

Look back at the original narrative in the second paragraph, which was purposely written in the manner it was, and consider where attribution has been placed, how it limits learning and what questions you can ask to improve your understanding of the event. We are cognitively efficient creatures, always looking for the shortcut to save energy. However, this efficiency comes at the expense of learning.

In this event, there were many other factors that we needed to consider, many of which would be focused on the limitations of our cognitive system. We CANNOT pay more attention; it has a limited capacity. What we can do is make it easier to prioritise and focus on the most important/and or relevant factors, and we do this by designing systems that take our limited capacity into mind. 

Monitoring four students is going to be at the limits of what is safely possible, especially when other factors are taken into consideration, such as instructor experience, visibility, current, task loading, comfort levels, etc. These factors are readily apparent and their significance obvious after the event, but in real-time with all of the other conflicting goals present, not so. When designing systems and processes, try to apply the key human factors principle: make it easier to do the right thing, and harder to do the wrong thing.

As an example of how this language can manifest itself, have a look at any agency training materials which describe adverse events or incidents, and look to see how agency and attribution are applied, and how little the context is considered. e.g. the following example is from a leadership-level training manual: a supervisor left the dive site before accounting for all of the divers in the group and two were left behind and suffered from hypothermia. The reason given for the abandonment was that the supervisor was distracted. The material then goes on to say that despite the supervisor having normally conducted good accounting procedures, this would not help in a lawsuit as a court would look at the event that occurred not what they normally did. What is missing is understanding ‘how the supervisor came to be distracted’ and what the context was. This would provide a much greater learning opportunity than the normal ‘make sure you account for everyone otherwise you could be in a lawsuit.’ “We cannot change the human condition, but we can change the conditions in which humans work.”—Professor James Reason.

Summary

We have a tendency, especially in Western cultures, to want to find out ‘who did it’ and ascribe blame to an individual agent. More often than not, the agent is the person who was closest to the event in time and space. In effect, we play the game of ‘you were last to touch it, so it was your fault’ but this rarely prevents future events from occurring. In reality, divers, instructors, instructor trainers, and dive centre managers are all managing complex interactions between people, environment, equipment and cultural/societal pressures with sensemaking only being made after the event. 

Photo by Peter Gaertner.

To be able to identify a single cause of an adverse event in diving is impossible because it doesn’t exist and yet this is what the language we use focuses on. We look for a root cause or a trigger event for an accident or incident. The research from Denoble et al, which described four stages (trigger event, disabling event, disabling injury and cause of death) of fatalities misses the context behind the trigger events and yet it is still used in incident analyses. Compare this to modern safety investigation programmes which have moved away from a root cause approach to a more systemic approach, like Accimap or Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) that take into account systems thinking and human factors principles/models. 

A response from Petar J Denoble’s response, Click Here

There are no formal investigation and analysis programmes or tools in the sports diving sector so any data that is produced is heavily biased by personal perspectives. However, that gap will be addressed before the end of 2021 when an investigation course will be launched to the public by The Human Diver. 

This two-day programme will provide an introduction to a systems- and human factors-based approach to event learning and will be based on current best practices from high-risk industries and academia and then tailored and focused on non-fatal events in the diving industry. There will also be a number of research programmes being developed over the next year or so which look at incidents, their causality and how to report them. The methodology will be relevant to fatalities but these investigations are often undertaken by law enforcement officers or coroners.

Photo by Kirill Egorov.

For the diving community, there is a need to look at how adverse events happen, not by attributing agency to individuals, but to look wider, to the system and the context so that we can understand how it made sense for that human agent to do what they did at the time. Ivan Pupulidy covers this clearly in the US Forest Service Learning Review, “In order to change culture, you have to change the assumptions that drive the culture.”

After note: The article was heavily influenced by the work of Crista Vesel whose referenced paper examined agentive language and how it influenced how the US Forest Service moved from Serious Accident Investigation Guide to a Learning Review. The review allowed more genuine inquiry to occur and find out the real reasons why serious events, including fatalities, occurred. You can find Vesel’s paper here: “Agentive Language in Accident Investigation: Why Language Matters in Learning from Events.”

Footnotes:

1. Lexico. Explore: agent. http://www.lexico.com/en/definition/ agent (accessed July 30, 2021). 

 2. Agentive Language in Accident Investigation: Why Language Matters in Learning from Events Crista Vesel ACS Chem. Health Saf. 2020, 27, 1, 34–39. 2020 3. Myers, D. Social Psychology, 11th ed.; McGraw-Hill: New York, 2013; pp 100−117

4. Fausey, C.; Long, B.; Inamon, A.; Boroditsky, L. Constructing agency: the role of language. Frontiers in Psychology 2010, 1, 1−11. 

5. Dekker, S. Why We Need New Accident Models; Lund University School of Aviation: Sweden, 2005.

6. Fausey, C. M.; Boroditsky, L. In English and Spanish Speakers Remember Causal Agents Differently, Proceedings of 30th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Washington, DC, July, 2008. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4425600t (accessed November 13, 2019).

7. Denoble, P.J; Caruso J.L.; de L Dear G.; Pieper C.F. and Vann R.D. Common Causes of Open Circuit Recreational Diving Fatalities. 2008

8. Learning Review (LR) Guide (March 2017); U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service accessed 30 Jul 2021


Gareth Lock has been involved in high-risk work since 1989. He spent 25 years in the Royal Air Force in a variety of front-line operational, research and development, and systems engineering roles which have given him a unique perspective. In 2005, he started his dive training with GUE and is now an advanced trimix diver (Tech 2) and JJ-CCR Normoxic trimix diver. In 2016, he formed The Human Diver with the goal of bringing his operational, human factors, and systems thinking to diving safety. Since then, he has trained more than 350 people face-to-face around the globe, taught nearly 2,000 people via online programmes, sold more than 4,000 copies of his book Under Pressure: Diving Deeper with Human Factors, and produced “If Only…,” a documentary about a fatal dive told through the lens of Human Factors and a Just Culture. In September 2021, he will be opening the first ever Human Factors in Diving conference. His goal: to bring human factors practice and knowledge into the diving community to improve safety, performance, and enjoyment.

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In this article published online on  September 2, 2021, Gareth Lock systematically examines the role of innate attribution biases and language, talks about agency and attribution, and explains why incident investigation may fail to help prevent similar incidents from occurring again. As an example of a failed approach, Lock refers to the paper “Common causes of open-circuit recreational scuba fatalities”, which I co-authored with my colleagues in 2008. While I appreciate Gareth’s work in general and the content of this particular article, I have to point out that our paper never intended to do what Gareth assumes and attributes to it.
1. In our paper, we do not investigate individual incidents. Instead, we attempted an epidemiological analysis based on the reported results of separate incident investigations.
2. We do not claim that triggers are the root causes. We provide clear, pragmatic definitions for all four categories we used in the paper.
3. We never attribute agency in the sense of subjective factors; our only agent is similar to an epidemiological agent, like a mechanical agent of injury (boat hitting diver), CO causing intoxication, and similar.
4. We are aware that there were causes beyond what was reported and that in most cases probably there were multiple causes, and we state it explicitly in the paper.
5. We aimed to identify contributing factors that could be targeted with preventive interventions (which we did not prescribe).
6. We assumed, that although we may never know the primordial cause(s), we still could intervene by preventing the domino effect or by interrupting the chain of events leading towards the fatal outcome. If we were not right in assuming it, why bother with teaching divers all possible corrective measures in an adverse event?I am looking forward to a bright future with much-improved incident analysis methods. I hope that my younger colleagues will have high-quality reports to work with trying to devise the best preventive interventions.

-PJ Denoble